The gaps assessors find most often

First assessments rarely fail on one dramatic flaw. They fail on a list of ordinary ones, each fixable, that nobody closed before the assessor arrived. Here is the list, with the fix for each.

Last updated: 2026-11-22.

Why this list matters. Findings go into the Security Assessment Report and the POA&M. High and Critical findings must be remediated and retested before authorization, and FedRAMP will not grant certification with open High findings. Every gap closed before the assessment is a finding that never gets written.

1. Cryptography that was never validated

What the assessor finds: encryption that is real but not FIPS 140-validated. The vendor said "FIPS-compliant" or "FIPS-capable," the team took it at face value, and the module does not appear on the CMVP validated list.

How to close it: check every module against the validated list, in transit and at rest, and replace the ones that are not on it. This is long-lead work in some stacks, so start it during the gap assessment, not during the assessment.

2. MFA with holes in it

What the assessor finds: MFA on the front door and nowhere else. Privileged access without a second factor, shared admin accounts, service accounts with standing credentials and no inventory.

How to close it: require MFA for all privileged access and for every user of the federal environment. Give every human their own account, inventory the service accounts, and justify each one.

3. Logs in a dozen places

What the assessor finds: audit logs scattered across systems, each with its own retention, and no way to reconstruct an event across the boundary. Sometimes the logs exist and nobody looks at them.

How to close it: send audit logs from every in-scope component to one central store, keep them long enough to cover the assessment window, and make sure someone reviews them. Centralized logging is one of the standard remediation items for a reason.

4. No configuration baseline

What the assessor finds: systems configured by habit rather than by a written standard. Two servers doing the same job are configured differently, and nobody can say which one is right.

How to close it: write the approved configuration for each component type, apply it consistently, and record every deviation with a reason and an approval. The baseline is also what makes the configuration management plan real instead of aspirational.

5. Scanning that is infrequent or incomplete

What the assessor finds: vulnerability scans run quarterly instead of monthly, or covering the operating system but not the databases and web applications. Sometimes scans run and the results sit in an inbox.

How to close it: scan all three surfaces monthly and track every finding in the POA&M with an owner and a due date. Work the clocks: 30 days for Critical and High, 90 for Moderate, 180 for Low. KEV-listed vulnerabilities follow CISA's catalog due dates.

6. A boundary nobody can draw

What the assessor finds: the authorization boundary described differently in the SSP, the architecture diagram, and the inventory. Components in scope that are missing from the inventory, or services in the data flow that nobody classified.

How to close it: draw the boundary once, in writing, and make the SSP, the diagrams, and the inventory agree with it. The inventory is the document assessors check first when they suspect the boundary is fuzzy.

7. A thin or rushed SSP

What the assessor finds: a System Security Plan that describes controls in general terms, marks too many as "planned," or describes a system that no longer matches the live environment. The SSP is the document the assessment is built from, so a weak one poisons everything downstream.

How to close it: start the SSP early, write it from the real system, and budget the typical 3–6 months for the documentation phase. If the SSP was written by an advisor, have your own engineers read it for accuracy before the assessor does. See evidence prep for what belongs in it.

8. Plans that were never exercised

What the assessor finds: an incident response plan and a contingency plan that exist on paper and have never been tested. The named responders have changed jobs. Nobody knows where the backups restore to.

How to close it: run a tabletop exercise for incident response and a restore test for contingency, and write down what was learned. A tested plan with known weaknesses beats an untested plan that claims perfection.

9. A penetration test past its shelf life

What the assessor finds: the initial penetration test was run more than 6 months before SAR submission, so it no longer counts. The assessment stalls while a new test is scheduled.

How to close it: time the test to the assessment, not to the calendar. Penetration testing is required for Moderate and High (not for Low or LI-SaaS) and at least every 12 months thereafter. If the assessment slips, check the test date before it slips past the window.

10. A POA&M that is stale or missing

What the assessor finds: findings tracked in a spreadsheet nobody updates, or not tracked at all. Overdue items with no deviation request, and no closure evidence for items marked fixed.

How to close it: run the POA&M on the FedRAMP template from the gap assessment onward, update it monthly, and treat closure evidence as part of the fix, not paperwork after it. Overdue items escalate under the ConMon Playbook, and missing deadlines without an approved deviation can end in suspension or revocation.

Quick wins first

Not every gap costs the same to close. If time is short, start with the cheap ones: centralize the logs, enforce MFA, write the baselines, and get the POA&M current. The expensive ones, crypto replacement and landing-zone work, need the longest lead time and should have started during the gap assessment. Run the self-check to see which of these apply to your system.

Frequently asked questions

Can an assessment pass with open findings?

Not with open High or Critical findings. Those must be remediated and retested before authorization. Lower findings are tracked in the POA&M with clocks of 90 days for Moderate and 180 days for Low.

What happens to findings after authorization?

They live in the POA&M, which is updated monthly as part of continuous monitoring. The ConMon Playbook ties overdue items to graduated escalation, and missing deadlines without an approved deviation can end in suspension or revocation.

Do vendor dependencies count as gaps?

Yes, where they sit inside the boundary. High-risk vendor dependencies must be mitigated to Moderate via compensating controls within 30 days, and FedRAMP will not approve an operational requirement (deviation) for a High vulnerability.

Check your own system